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ABSTRACT 
 
Agencification is one of the characteristics of the wave of New Public Management (NPM) 
which has become prominent in the last few decades. Public management literature raises 
questions concerning the rationale behind agencification and how this public management 
reform is being implemented in Sub Sahara African countries where the NPM ideology is 
foreign. This study explored how the development of Technical Education Vocational and 
Entrepreneurship Training Authority (TEVETA) can be interpreted from the perspective of 
the agencification of quality assurance in the TEVETA sector in Zambia. The study focused 
on four main issues namely: (i) establishment of TEVETA (ii) organisation and governance of 
TEVETA (iii) funding of TEVETA and (iv) internal and external change drivers. To 
undertake this study, a qualitative research strategy was employed and the study used 
document review and semi structured interview guides as means of data collection. 
The study argues that TEVETA is a product of the Technical Education, Vocational and 
Entrepreneurship Training (TEVET) reforms of the 1990s which swept across the country and 
was supported by Brentwood institutions namely the World Bank and IMF. Following the 
liberalisation of the economy, TEVETA was established to meet the needs of the local 
environment and the parastatal companies. It was established through the act of parliament, 
with a mandate to regulate, co-ordinate and monitor Technical Education, Vocational and 
Entrepreneurship Training. TEVETA is governed by a board of directors who serve tenures of 
three years and are appointed by the Minister of Education, Science Vocational Training and 
Early Education (MESVTEE) in accordance to the TEVET act. The Government of Republic 
of Zambia (GRZ) is the main source of funding at TEVETA and the current level of public 
funding to TEVETA is inconsistent and insufficient and has not grown to match up with the 
current demands of the TEVET sector in the country. The study argues that TEVETA 
operates with low levels of autonomisation with insufficient resources. Based on these study 
findings, the study recommends that if TEVETA is granted the levels of autonomisation and 
resources it requires fully, then it can gratify its mandate completely. 
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CHAPTER ONE:             INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Public management in Africa has experienced many reforms in the previous decades. These 
reforms have brought about changes in the structures and governance of the public service 
sector including African higher education. Many scholars in developed countries such as 
Christensen and Lægreid (2005) and Pollitt (2009) have written much about this subject in 
their own specific national contexts, but the opposite is true for developing countries 
specifically Sub-Sahara African countries, in the sense that there are hardly any studies on 
public management dynamics in Africa. Therefore, this study is intended to contribute to the 
better understanding of public management in Africa focusing on one case, that is, the use of 
agencification in the Zambian public management setting. The study specifically focuses on 
four issues: (i) establishment of TEVETA (ii) organisation and governance of TEVETA (iii) 
funding of TEVETA, and (iv) internal and external change drivers.  
This introductory chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 provides a background to the 
study, section 1.2 presents the establishment of TEVETA. Section 1.3 provides the motivation 
for the study, section 1.4 presents the problem statement. This is followed by section 1.5 
significance of the study. Section 1.6 provides the limitations of the study. Finally, section 1.7 
outlines the structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
One of the strategies governments have over the years introduced in the delivery of public 
services, is the establishment of semi - autonomous agencies or public entities which render 
public functions on behalf of ministries. This process is called agencification. Agencification 
allows for the separation of policy making and implementation functions or responsibilities, 
in the sense that it enables government ministries to focus on developing policies and 
providing strategic direction while agencies are tasked with the implementation of such 
policies and the direct provision of the services (Public Service Commission, 2012). In 
Zambia, the ministry responsible for education had the task of quality assurance for the 
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Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training (TEVET) sector and 
currently this task is the responsibility of the agency
1
. 
 
In the Ministry of Education, Science Vocational Training and Early Education (MESVTEE) 
an agency called Technical Education Vocational Entrepreneurship Training Authority 
(TEVETA) was established in 1998 with its office situated in Lusaka. The main aim of 
TEVETA which is the main thrust for this present study is to foster and enhance better 
management of higher education institutions in the TEVET sector as a quality assurance 
agency (TEVETA, 2010). 
 
The establishment of such an agency is a result of the implementation of the ideas and 
practices with New Public Management (NPM), but many of the ideas associated with 
Western-style management are more generally maybe inappropriate for use in other social and 
cultural settings. The implementation of these foreign management practices has been going 
on for some decades, harking back in some ways to colonial masters (Peters, 2001). This 
argument ignites more interest on this study conducted in a developing country as compared 
to the developed world where such NPM ideologies have originated from. Hence this study 
examines how the development of TEVETA can be interpreted from the perspective of the 
agencification of quality assurance in the TEVET sector in Zambia. The study examines the 
rationale behind the establishment of TEVETA, the organisation and governance of 
TEVETA, the trend of funding of TEVETA since its establishment and the change drivers. 
 
1.2 Establishment of TEVETA 
 
The major focus of TEVETA is on the TEVT (Technical Education Vocational Training) 
institutions in the country. TEVT institutions in Zambia are considered part of the higher 
education system. In the Zambian context, higher education is defined as post secondary
2
 
education. Before the establishment of TEVETA, the MESVTEE was responsible for quality 
assurance in the education sector including the TEVET sector. 
                                                 
1
 As illustrated in the institutional matrix of political governance by Braun (2008). 
2
 Post secondary education is education pursued after the 12
th
 grade whose criteria for entry is a grade 12 
school certificate. 
3 
 
The establishment of TEVETA can be traced back to the time of independence. Mukuni 
(2014) reveals that at independence
3
 Zambia was one of the prosperous nations in the 
Southern part of Africa. This author further indicates that the copper mines were the greatest 
employers of skilled labour, which at independence consisted predominantly of expatriate 
personnel. Shortly after independence, a number of expatriates left the country, thereby 
creating a great demand for local human resources. As a result of the growing demand for 
skilled labour, the government developed a vibrant demand driven skills developing system 
through the TEVT Policy of 1969 and TEVT Act of 1970. 
 
By the early 1990s, however, Zambia’s economy had become one of the least developed in 
the world due to the drastic fall in copper prices in the 1970s. Industry experienced severe 
foreign exchange restrictions which constrained the supply of inputs to production. The poor 
performance of the economy led to shrinkage of the formal labour market and an expansion of 
the informal sector, which by 1995 was estimated at about 70 percent of the labour force 
(Mukuni, 2014). 
 
Literature on the TEVET reforms in Zambia indicates that this state of affairs had an impact 
on the TEVT sector in two major ways. The first one is that public funding to the sector 
declined, resulting in a drastic fall in training standards as a consequence of insufficient inputs 
to training. Secondly, the majority of skills training graduates could not find employment in 
the formal sector, which had by 1995 shrunk to about 30 % of the labour force. 
 
It is against this background it became necessary for the TEVT policy of 1969 to be reviewed. 
Therefore, Zambia embarked on a Vocational Education and Training (VET) reform process 
in 1994 with a view to aligning skills development to the nation’s socio-economic skills 
needs. It was this policy review process that resulted in the TEVET from TEVT initially 
obtainable under the Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training (DTEVT). 
So, the reviewed policy embraced entrepreneurship in addition to Technical and Vocational 
Education and Training (TVET) and led to the formulation of the TEVET policy of 1996 
enacted by parliament by Act No.13 of 1998 and amended by Act no. 11 of 2005 (FNDP 
2006 - 2010). 
 
                                                 
3
 Zambia became independent on the 24
th
 October, 1964. 
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The GRZ has been implementing reforms in the TEVET sector since 1994, through the 
MESVTEE. The primary instrument driving the reform process has been the government’s 
vision and intent statements articulated in the TEVET policy of 1996. Under this policy, the 
government working with other stakeholders in skills development, sought to create a national 
system for TEVET provision, which would satisfy the labour market, socio-economic 
concerns and resource based opportunities in the economy. More specifically, the new 
TEVET system aims at balancing the supply of skilled labour at all levels with the demands 
of the economy; acting as a vehicle for improved productivity and income generation; as well 
as being an instrument for the minimization of inequalities among the people (TEVETA, 
2006). In the light of the above, a number of achievements have been scored and notable 
among these is the establishment of TEVETA which replaced the Department for Technical 
Education and Vocational Training (DTEVT).  
 
1.3 Motivation of the study 
 
The motivation for this study is that some of the generic management ideas that have become 
popular in the industrialised countries have also been introduced into the administrative 
system of less developed and transitional countries (Peters, 1996). The successful 
implementation of such reforms using generic management techniques and creating quasi-
public organisations for providing public services (Robinson and White, 1998) depends on the 
existence of the required managerial talent and the existence of private and quasi – public 
organisations that are capable of meeting the challenges implied in these reforms. This is the 
context in which agencies have been established for the provision of the public services from 
the government ministries.  
 
Therefore, this study was inspired by these trends of international reforms in the provision of 
public services around the world leading to the establishment of agencies in both developed 
and developing countries. Pollitt et al. (2001) state that there is little doubt that the world is 
facing a ‘regulatory explosion’ and an epidemic of ‘agency fever’, with quasi - autonomous 
regulatory agencies becoming accepted as ‘best practice’ all over the world and as a policy 
fashion of our time. As the wave of such international reforms sweeps the globe from north to 
south, in Zambia however, there is no study conducted on agencification processes in the 
public management system of the country.  
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1.4 Problem statement 
 
There is a varied array of higher education institutions in Zambia, including universities, 
colleges and TEVT, designed to meet the special needs of various sectors of the national 
economy for qualified personnel (GRZ, 1996). Considering the nature of Zambian higher 
education and the agencification of quality assurance, the research problem is formulated as 
follows: 
How can the development of TEVETA be interpreted from the perspective of 
the agencification of quality assurance in the TEVET sector in Zambia? 
 In order to answer this overall research problem the following specific research questions 
were raised: 
 What was the main rationale for setting up TEVETA? 
 
 How is TEVETA organised and governed? 
 
 How has the funding of TEVETA developed since its establishment? 
 
 What are the main internal and external change drivers of TEVETA?  
 
1.5 Significance of the study 
 
Agencification is in fashion. It is undoubtedly not a new phenomenon (Wettenhall, 2005), but 
its role in public management can be argued to have intensified in recent years. Therefore, it 
is hoped that this study will provide insights into the understanding of the agencification of 
quality assurance in Zambia. It is also hoped that the study will grant motivation to interested 
parties in Zambian higher education to engage in a constructive discussion around this 
subject. Further, it is expected that the study shall serve as a basis for future research into the 
agencification of quality assurance in Zambia and also for developing an improved system of 
quality assurance. 
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Furthermore, this study may unlock another perspective regarding this subject for both 
researchers and policy makers, and also act as a basis of supplementary sources of 
information to the literature concerning this subject in developing countries specifically Sub-
Saharan African countries. 
 
1.6 Limitations of the study 
 
The study has the following limitations. This study was conducted at TEVETA, an agency 
which operates at national level. Therefore, in this regard it could have been prudent if the 
perceptions of the TEVET institutions who are the major stakeholders were captured in the 
study. Furthermore, due to inadequate resources and limited time available, the researcher 
could have conducted more interviews with the intent of gathering more information 
regarding the subject. With the mentioned restrictions, the study was only conducted at a 
single agency and at MESVTEE with a minimal sample. Nonetheless, this study has provided 
information which can be deemed useful concerning this subject and can also act as a basis 
for further research. 
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter one (current chapter) includes:  
Introduction, background to the study, establishment of TEVETA, motivation of the study, 
problem statement, significance of the study, limitation of the study and structure of the 
thesis. 
 
Chapter two gives basic information about Zambia. 
 
In the third chapter, the literature review and the analytical framework of the study are 
presented.  
 
In the fourth chapter the research methodology employed in this study is discussed. 
 
Chapter five gives a presentation, analysis and interpretation of the findings.  
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Finally, the last chapter provides the conclusions, based on the study’s findings. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BASIC INFORMATION 
ON ZAMBIA 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter of the study presents basic information on Zambia’s political context and 
governance. Section 2.2 presents the background of the political system. State structure and 
administrative system is presented in section 2.3 and section 2.4 presents the public sector 
reforms. MESVTEE and TEVET institutions are presented in section 2.5 and conclusion is 
presented in section 2.6.  
2.2 Background: The political system 
 
Pre-independence Zambia was governed between 1891 and 1923 by the British South African 
(BSA) Company. From 1924 to 1963, it was governed by the British Colonial Government. 
During this colonial period, as a colonial territory, Zambia was known as Northern Rhodesia. 
Since the attainment of independence in 1964, the country has experienced three Republics, 
starting with multi - party politics that allowed the existence of the opposition political parties 
until 1972 when the one - party system came into existence. However, although it was a one 
party system, the citizens still participated in the elections to elect their leaders at both 
parliamentary and local government level (Kelly, 1999). 
 
In 1990, the third republic came into play and Zambia reverted to pluralism adopting a multi - 
party democratic system which the country is enjoying up to date.  
 
2.3 State structure and administrative system 
 
Zambia, a unitary state and constitutional democracy has three levels of government and these 
are the central government, provincial administration and local administration. Zambia has 10 
provinces and each of the 10 provincial administration headquarters is headed by a deputy 
minister (appointed and answerable to the president) assisted by a permanent secretary who is 
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head of the secretariat and coordinates government activities in the province. Furthermore, in 
each province there are provincial heads of department who act as the link between the district 
and central line ministries. These are answerable to their sector ministries on technical matters 
while administratively they are supervised by the provincial permanent secretary on day to 
day activities (http://www.citieslocalgovernments.org/gold/Upload/countryprofile/Zambia. 
pdf). 
 
The President is directly elected through national presidential and parliamentary elections 
which are held every five years and s/he heads both the state and government. According to 
the national constitution, the sitting President can only serve for two terms and is also 
empowered by the constitution to nominate 10 Members of Parliament (MPs). The president 
forms a cabinet by appointing 20 ministers
4
 from the MPs and not more than five from the 
nominated MPs. The central government is the core of the Zambian public management 
structure which is organised around various ministries and provides directions for the entire 
public sector and coordinates all activities with the involvement of the lower levels. In this 
regard, the minister occupies the top political authority office whose main task is to manage 
an integrated administrative system and also serves other ministerial functions 
simultaneously.  
 
2.4 Public sector reforms 
 
In order to improve the provision of public services in the country, the GRZ embarked on the 
Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP). Ayeni (2001) pointed out that in 1993, the 
government officially launched the PSRP designed to transform the public service into a 
leaner, efficient, cost effective, responsive and affordable organisation capable of delivering 
quality services and providing an enabling environment for private sector and individual 
participation in national development. 
The objective of the PSRP according to Ayeni (2001) included: 
                                                 
4
 The following are the Ministries: 1. Justice 2. Defence 3. Finance 4. Home affairs 5. Health 6. Sports and Youth 
7. Commerce, trade and industry 8. Mines, energy and water development 9. In formation and broadcasting 
10. MESVTEE 11. Lands, environment and natural resources 12. Local government and housing 13. Tourism and 
arts 14. Labour and social security 15. Gender and child development 16. Community development, mother 
and child health 17. Chiefs and traditional affairs 18. Transport, communication, works and supply 19. Foreign 
affairs 20. Agriculture and livestock development (This was the available information at the time of research 
however, some ministries were split on the 18
th
 September, 2015).  
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 To improve government capacity, to analyse and implement national policies and 
perform its function. 
 To effectively manage expenditure to meet fiscal stabilisation objectives; and 
 To make the public service more efficient and responsive to the needs of the populace. 
In view of the above, Olowu (2002) pointed out that the PSRP had three components which 
was restructuring of public services, management and human resources improvement, and 
decentralisation and strengthening of local government. 
The component of restructuring of ministries and provinces aimed to stream-line and 
rationalise the structures and operations of government ministries, departments, agencies and 
provinces to attain leaner and less costly, but more efficient public services (Ayeni, 2001). 
Furthermore, he pointed out that management and human resources improvement aimed to 
develop critical skills to enable senior civil servants to more effectively manage public 
services. In addition, to put in place an effective personnel evaluation instrument and 
management information system to enable the government effectively compile and manage 
data needed for personnel decision making, and to improve the remuneration and conditions 
of services. 
The component of decentralisation according to Ayeni (2001) aimed at making local 
government in particular and district government in general, more efficient, cost effective and 
responsive to the needs of local communities in the delivery of services, and to ensure that 
local government is adequately financed. 
It is in light of such programmes that the public sector has experienced changes in various 
dimensions including the education sector and organisation structures for the purpose of 
improving the delivering of the public services. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) indicate that the 
public sector reforms involve the deliberate change to the structures and process of public 
sector organisations with the objective of getting them to run better. 
In view of the above reforms in the public sector in the country, according to the study which 
was conducted in 2004, Zambia had about 40 agencies. From these agencies, 4 were created 
under Public Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCAP) spun off from their parent 
department namely, the National Institute of Public Administration, the civil servant training 
institute, the Zambia Wild Authority which manages parks and the Zambia Training Institute. 
11 
 
Agencies are established by the act of parliament, and work under way to adapt an 
overarching legal framework governing the operations of the agencies. However, this has 
been abandoned following the suspension of the reform program. Currently, government 
policy is to reduce progressively the subvention to these agencies to zero, forcing them to 
stand on their own feet (Levy and Kpundeh, 2004). From Levy and Kpundeh’s argument, it 
can be pointed out that the government has boosted agencies in the country to have their own 
budgetary lines and function within their mandate through the act of parliament hence making 
them to stand on their own. 
 
2.5 MESVTEE and TEVET institutions 
 
The MESVTEE
5
 whose headquarters is located in Lusaka is the main government body 
responsible for all levels of education in Zambia. The current education system is 
decentralized with hierarchical decision-making procedures that run from the national 
headquarters to provincial, district and institutional levels. The ministry has two permanent 
secretaries, one is in charge of higher education in the country and the other one is responsible for 
general education. Both secretaries are answerable to the minister. The Ministry consists of 
five directorates – planning and information; standards and curriculum development; human 
resources and administration; teacher education and specialised education; and distance 
learning. TEVETA falls under the Department of Vocational Education and Training (DVET) 
which is in charge of formulating and providing policy guidelines to training institutions; 
promoting TVET; increasing stakeholder participation in the provision of TVET; and quality 
assessment of TVET programmes. The staff at MESVTEE are employed on permanent basis 
as civil servants based on their qualifications (UNESCO-UNEVOC, 2010). 
 
In Zambia, the TEVET institutions can be either public or private. Public TVET is managed 
by a number of different Ministries depending upon the particular ministry’s function. The 
former Ministry of Education operated schools of continuing education which offered skill 
training and academic courses. This ministry has since merged with the former Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Vocational Training to form the MESVTEE. Under the MESVTEE, 
                                                 
5
 This was the available information at the time of research. Following the splitting of some ministries on 18
th
 
September, 2015 MESVTEE is now divided into two Ministries namely the Ministry of general education & 
Ministry of higher education (http://lusakavoice.com/2015/09/18/president-edgar-lungus-parliament-speech-
in-full/). 
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there are 23 TEVET institutions. The other TEVET institutions fall under the Ministry of 
Youth, Sport and Child Development, Agriculture, Tourism, and Community Development, 
and Social Welfare adding up to 25.5 percent of public TEVET institutions. There were 286 
registered TEVET institutions in 2009 as revealed in the records. The Ministry of Community 
Development and Social Services is in charge of running rural training centres that offer 
short-courses in skills development. The Ministry of Sports, Youth and Child Development 
runs Skill Training Centres that offer informal skill training. Private TVET is provided by 
church organisations and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and these are demand-
driven and mainly located in urban areas. All TVET institutions need to be registered with 
TEVETA (Corporate Strategy, 2010-2012).  
 
TEVET institutions under the MESVTEE are run by management boards the members of 
which are appointed by the Minister by statutory instrument. These boards help government 
in running administrative affairs of the institutions, approve budgets and hire staff. Whereas 
management boards would have the power to appoint the Principal, Vice Principal and other 
staff, the existing staff in training institutions may opt to be employees of the management 
boards or choose to be public officers seconded to the boards (Mukuni, 2014). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has given a brief account of the political system in the country, state structure 
and administrative system, public sector reforms, and MESVTEE and TEVET institutions. In 
terms of governance, Zambia is a democratic country with a multi party political system and 
the president is the head of both the government and the state. The president is 
constitutionally allowed to serve only for two terms and a term has duration of five years. 
There are three levels of government in the country which are the central government, 
provincial administration and local administration. The cabinet is made by the president 
appointing 20 ministers from parliament and the central government is organised around these 
ministries. The public sector in Zambia has faced many reforms and these reforms have not 
spared the MESVTEE and trickled down to the TEVET sector. It is through these reforms the 
country has seen changes in the governance structures and the birth of various agencies 
operating under specific ministries at arm’s length. Each agency is established by an act of 
parliament which stipulates, among other things, its functions, powers and composition of the 
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staff. The next chapter presents the literature review and the analytical framework of the 
study.  
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE 
REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the literature reviewed guided by the overall research problem: How can 
the development of TEVETA be interpreted from the perspective of the agencification of 
quality assurance in the TEVET sector in Zambia? However, most of the literature accessed 
concerning agencification is from the developed countries as there is hardly any research 
work going on concerning this subject in the developing countries.  
In this light, public management globally has experienced some radical reforms in the past 
two or more decades (Aucoin, 1990; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004), in the sense that public 
management has witnessed a shift in the balance between bureaucratic autonomy and 
bureaucratic integration, marked by ‘agencification’ (Thynne, 2003: 323). ‘Agencification’ 
has signified a transfer of government activities to agency - type organisations which serve 
specialized needs outside ministerial departments. In the framework of the NPM trend, 
governments across continents have established agencies at arm’s length from ministerial 
departments in order to take care of certain regulatory and administrative tasks (Pollitt et al. 
2004; Verhoest et al. 2004).  
Taking the above considerations as a starting-point, in this chapter, literature on 
agencification will be reviewed which will be done under the following headings: the 
ideology of agencification and characteristics, why agencification, steering of agencies, few 
examples of cases of agencification in developed and developing countries, NPM and 
internationalisation of agencies, and the analytical framework. 
3.2 The ideology of agencification and characteristics 
 
Historically, ministerial portfolios have been arranged either as ‘integrated ministries’, 
meaning that a ministerial portfolio constitutes a unitary organisation, or as a vertically 
specialised structure, meaning that a portfolio is split into a ministerial, or cabinet-level, 
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department on the one hand and one or more separate agencies on the other. Over time, 
agencies seem to have been moved out of and into ministerial departments, often in a cyclical 
manner (Aucoin 1990; Pollitt 2008; Verhoest et al. 2007). It is against this background Pollitt 
et al. (2001) noted that currently public sector management is experiencing what is called a 
global agency fever. 
The rise of executive agencies or agencification worldwide in the 1980s and 1990s can be 
traced from the strains noted by governments such as work overload to the Civil Service and 
ministries, over bloated civil service, insufficient attention given to the service delivery, the 
pressure to restrain spending and make services to citizens more responsive and accountable, 
the rising citizens expectations with respect to the quality of public services, and a lack of 
clear lines of responsibilities and accountability (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007; Pollitt et al. 
2001). In addition, the quest for better service delivery in the public service in the new 
international regulatory orthodoxy as hypothesized
6
 by Pollitt et al. (2004) is enhanced by the 
emergence of a universal reform model, which is based on the assumption that the creation of 
autonomous agencies will improve regulatory performance and efficiency without having 
negative sides – effects on other values, such as political control and democracy. However, 
Devas et al. (2001) suggest that agencification is part of the neoliberal reform ideology that 
seeks to reduce the size and scope of government in public service delivery. 
 
In view of the above arguments, executive agencies are seen as a mechanism to improve 
service delivery in both developed and developing countries. In the words of Bresser Pereirra 
(1999), agencies represent the creation of quangos, other quasi - public organisations, and 
organisations that bridge the state-society boundary as a means of providing public services in 
(presumably) a more efficient and effective manner. 
 
Executive agencies have a number of characteristics which describes them in differentiation 
from other organisations. Pollitt et al. (2004) call these characteristics a tripod of doctrines. 
According to these authors, tripod of doctrines refers to a new form of public organisation that 
is characterised by disaggregation, autonomisation and contractualisation. Pollitt at al. (2004: 
36 - 39) defines the core elements of this tripod as follows: Disaggregation as a process 
whereby an organisation is formally separated from its parent body and clearly delimited as a 
                                                 
6
 According to Christensen and Lægreid (2007) the statement is a hypothesis and not evidence - based fact and 
therefore needs to be examined through empirical studies. 
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separate entity. Autonomisation is defined as a process through which bodies are granted 
freedom to make their own choices about internal arrangements. Contractualisation is 
described as the idea of putting relationships within the public sector, whether between 
purchasers and providers, or Ministries and chief executives, on some sort of contractual or 
quasi – contractual basis, usually linked to performance.  These characteristics are comparable 
to the ones identified by Lægreid and Verhoest (2010) which are organisational form, 
autonomy and control, specialization, coordination, and performance and results. 
 
Lægreid and Verhoest (2010) describe these characteristics as follows; - Organisational form 
refers to the different names assigned to agencies, such as hybrids and quangos. Autonomy 
refers to the level of decision making competency (discretion) of an organisation, while 
control deals with the constraints which can be imposed on these organisations by their parent 
ministry so as to influence decisions about their day to day operations. Specialization is 
described as the creation of new public sector organisations, with limited objectives and 
specific tasks, out of traditional core-administrations and coordination refers to the purposeful 
alignment of tasks and efforts of units in order to achieve a defined goal. Finally, they define 
performance in terms of effectiveness, equity, user-satisfaction, and quality. 
 
3.3 Why agencification? 
 
Literature on public management has highlighted various rationales for agencification. In the 
views of Trondal and Egeberg (2013) agencification has been accounted for by (i) 
organisational, (ii) functional, (iii) contingency, and (iv) institutional (myth) approaches. 
According to an organisational or institutional approach agencies come as a result of power 
struggles and compromises conditioned by pre-existing organisational structures. 
Organisational change is framed by the heritage of structures and new agencies are thus likely 
to be embedded within existing organisational architectures (Radin, 2012: 17). To contribute 
to this discussion, Christensen and Lægreid (2006) add that the creation of agencies can also 
be seen as a trend in public policy and as a fashionable idea within the realms of public 
management. 
In the functionalist view, agencification is a response to collective action problems. The 
principal-agent model is often the analytical expression of this functional logic, together with 
the notion of transaction costs (Tallberg, 2003: 25). Further, Tallberg points out that the 
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benefits of agencies lie in the reduction of political transaction costs, by providing solutions to 
collective-action problems that prevent efficient political exchange.  
In the contingency approach, contingent events may help to explain institutional change and 
the timing of organisational birth (March and Olsen, 1989). In the same line of thought, 
Trondal and Egeberg (2013) mention that the decisions to create agencies have been 
motivated by needs to respond to particular circumstances of the moment, and in some cases 
to crisis.  
To address the question of why the agency form has become popular over the past decades, 
the economic approach
7
 points out that agencies are more efficient than other organisational 
forms in the central government (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). In the same vein - 
agencification has been identified to have several aims and some of those aims are increased 
efficiency, strengthened and clarified responsibility and accountability lines, a more 
encouraged and professional administration, and a more service oriented administration 
placed closer to citizens (OECD, 2005: 108 - 111).  
Pollitt et al. (2004) and other scholars have identified a number of reasons for creating 
agencies (see table 1). 
 
The itemized reasons for creation of agencies presented in table 1 (Pollitt et al., 2004) have 
several features which can be noticed. For instance, Pollitt et al. (2004) indicate that these 
reasons may be inspired by a wide variety of diverse motives. In addition, these authors point 
out that the itemized list contains tensions and even incoherencies within themselves such as 
potential tension between the motive of liberating managers to manage and the motive of 
increasing political steering ability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The economic approach group includes the rational choice and principal - agent models (Dunleavy, 1991; 
Molander, Nilsson, & Schick, 2002; James, 2003). 
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Table 1. Reasons for the creation of agencies  
 
Scholars Reasons 
Pollitt et al. (2004) 1. To lessen political interference in order to allow managers to 
manage.  
2. To lessen political interference in order to allow regulatory or 
quasi-judicial decisions to be taken in an impartial way.  
3. To strengthen political oversight by creating separate organisations 
that can be given clear targets.  
4. To put public services closer to their users so as to increase user-
responsiveness.  
5. To enhance expertise by allowing specialization (i.e moving away 
from large, generalist bureaucracies).  
6. To enhance flexibility by moving out of the ‘iron cage’ of central 
civil service rules.   
7. To pay off political allies.  
8. To distance senior bureaucrats from boring, routine operational 
work and to leave them with high status policy and strategy work. 
9. To distance senior bureaucrats from boring, routine operational 
work and to leave them with high status policy and strategy work. 
Powell & DiMaggio 
(2004) 
10. To gain legitimacy by imitating an organisational fashion, which is 
seen to be associated with modernization. 
Talbot & Caulfield 
(2002)  
11. To create islands of income generation which can be ‘milked’ for 
various purposes.  
12.To create ‘islands of excellence’ in otherwise failing or ‘backward’ 
public administrations 
 
Source: Pollitt et al. (2004) 
Furthermore, in an attempt to elaborate the reasons for the creation of agencies, Pollitt et al. 
(2004) indicate that there are more obvious tensions between some of the motives listed. For 
example, finding jobs for political allies and lessening political interference or enhancing 
expertise.  
 
The other aspect which can be observed is that a single agency can hold various motives 
regarding its creation. For instance, Pollitt et al. (2004) point out that a single agency reform 
may quite conceivably be fuelled by four or more of these motives simultaneously, and may 
appear to hold advantages for a number of different groups such as the politicians, senior civil 
servants and professional experts. It is for this reason these authors concluded that a particular 
reform may therefore be embarked upon for ambiguous and or contradictory purposes. 
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3.4 Steering of agencies 
 
The question of how agencies can be steered best has attracted a lot of ‘grey literature’, but 
somewhat less academic attention. Considerable attention has been given to the kind of 
performance reporting that should be required of agencies – typically recommendations for 
good practice (Pollitt et al, 2004). However, academic work which has been done by various 
scholars indicates considerable variety, agency by agency. For instance, Hogwood et al. 
(2000) found that some agencies with politically sensitive tasks were bombarded with 
questions from the legislature, and closely monitored by their ‘nervous parent ministry’, while 
other agencies were virtually ignored by politicians. A study by Gains (1999) indicated 
considerable contrasts in the relationships between various agencies and their ministries, 
depending on a variety of factors, including the degree of monopoly, the degree of financial 
independence, and the previous history of relationships inside the parent ministry. 
 
At the same time, there are quite a number of studies which found that ministries are either 
too strong or interfering, or too weak or passive. For instance, in Latvia, the study conducted 
by Pollitt found that ministries lack the capacity to control their agencies (Pollitt and Talbot, 
2004). However, elsewhere Pollit et al. (2004) note that the balance seems to have swung too 
far in the opposite direction. For instance, Aucoin (1996) argues strongly that in Canada the 
first generation of Special Operating Agencies lacked sufficient autonomy. In Tanzania the 
theoretical autonomy of agencies is frequently crippled by cashflow shortages and the tight 
grip kept by the President and his Secretary General (Talbot and Caulfield, 2002). 
 
In another study, Van Thiel (2001) found some evidence for ‘reversal of control’ 
(autonomized bodies becoming stronger than their ministries) especially in the Netherlands 
where ZBOs (Zelfstandige BestuursOrganen)
8
 had a monopoly in their activity and where 
they had been created by redefining an organisation that was already outside a ministry, rather 
than being ‘hived off’ from a ministry. However, in some cases, as argued by Kickert (2001), 
‘a number of the new quasi-autonomous executive agencies have found that, as a result of 
their new status, ministerial control of their policy direction is stronger than before’. Both 
arguments by Van Thiel and Kickert display a mixed picture, where in some cases ministries 
seem weak and in others they seem the opposite. It is in this light Pollitt et al. (2004) 
                                                 
8
 Dutch term or phase meaning independent Governance bodies. 
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concluded that the situation in which the ministry is either weak or strong in relationship to its 
agencies seems to depend partly on a number of task specific factors, such as the degree of 
competition, the degree of self-financing, the degree of political sensitivity of the task, and so 
on. 
 
In terms of the relationship between the agency and the ministry, Braun notes that the agency 
does not exist in isolation but it is interconnected with the other institutional levels
9
 which can 
be observed in the institutional matrix of political governance (Braun, 2008: 232). Braun 
further points out that a reform of ministries may have implications for representation of 
policy sectors on the level of cabinet, and it will have effects on the governance and 
organisations of agencies because each institutional level is associated with its own major 
activities. 
 
3.5 Few examples of cases of agencification in 
developed and developing countries 
 
Executive agencies are key institutions in most developed countries (Christensen et al., 2008), 
but also in developing countries which have not been spared by the wave of NPM.  
Pollitt et al. (2004) reveal how the tripod model of agencification has been applied in 
developed countries. In a study conducted in the Netherlands, these authors note that Dutch 
agencies are structurally disaggregated. They have their own titles and chief executives, their 
own organisation charts, buildings and logos. The degree of autonomization – of delegated 
authority and discretion – is real but not huge and it has been most marked in the financial 
sphere. With respect to personnel policy freedoms, agencies have not proceeded much faster 
than general civil service reforms, and could not be described as possessing much greater 
autonomy than their parent ministries. In terms of the autonomy of the Dutch agencies, Pollitt 
et al. (2004) concluded that the overall autonomy of Dutch agencies could be said to be 
somewhat less than most UK Next Steps agencies
10
, and much less than Swedish agencies. 
To sum up their study in the Netherlands by putting into consideration the tripod model, 
Pollitt et al. (2004) found that Dutch agencies appear to have three “half legs”. They are 
                                                 
9
 The other institutional levels are Government and cabinet, Ministry and the knowledge space. 
10
 UK Next Step agencies are agencies in the UK which are part of the government departments but have their 
own managerial and budgetary line and perform part of the UK government functions. 
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structurally disaggregated, but this disaggregation has no legal or constitutional 
reinforcement. They have additional operational autonomy, but mainly on the narrow – if 
important – front of accounting and fiscal freedoms. They have all the paraphernalia of 
performance indicators and agreements, but there is at least a suspicion that hitherto these 
have been more for decoration than for active steering by parent ministries. 
In another study in Sweden, Pollitt et al. (2004) concluded that the agency reform in Sweden 
is likely to continue to rely upon informal relationships between agency and Ministry staff. 
Pollitt et al. further explain that any contractual relationship between agency and Ministry is 
supported by ongoing exchanges about what can be expected from agencies, and agency 
expertise and in this way, agencies continue to maintain substantial independence from their 
(small) ministerial counterparts. 
Agencification in Sub-Saharan African countries is in many respects similar to experiences in 
Western Europe (Caulfield, 2006). This can be attributed to both the colonial heritage of most 
developing countries and the important role of international donor organisations. Differences 
in the strategies between Francophone and Anglophone countries can almost directly be 
related to former colonial powers in these countries.  For instance, the agency model in 
Tanzania is largely copied from the Next Steps Agencies model in the United Kingdom 
(Sulle, 2008). 
Agencies in Tanzania display hybrid characteristic features of the tripod model in terms of 
their autonomy and control. They have elements of the traditional model, that is, they are 
heavily controlled ex ante in several aspects and they are structurally placed outside their 
parent Ministries (Sulle, 2010). Sulle’s observation was also shared by Caulfield (2006) who 
indicated that agencies have been physically separated from their parent ministries. This was 
not only observed by Sulle and Caufield but also by Kwasi-Agyeman (2015) who conducted a 
study at Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFund) in Ghana. GETFund is physically separated 
from the parent ministry and government has a hand in its operations. 
3.6 NPM and internationalization of agencies 
 
As highlighted earlier, the creation of agencies can be related to the dominance of NPM in 
public management. The ideologies of NPM and associated reforms have spread across 
borders and these reforms have even been spread to countries where they might not have been 
expected to be readily accepted (Peters, 2001). For instance, Kickert (1994) points out that the 
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ideas of creating agencies and decentralizing government have been adopted in Netherlands, 
which has had a highly centralized government for quite some time. Indeed, literature of 
public management has revealed that agency fever is spreading around the world and agencies 
are in fashion,  for example, the implementation of the agencification programme in Canada 
started around 1993 (Prince, 2000). As the wave sweeps Asia, the implementation of such 
ideologies, for example, in Japan can be traced in 1998 through the creation of Independent 
Administrative Corporations (Yamamoto, 2000). 
This fever has also not spared Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, Ghana was the first country 
and among the first few countries in the developing world to embark upon ‘agencification’ in 
the civil service around the 1980s (Ofosu-Adarkwa, 2000). Another example concerns 
Tanzania, where the executive agency programme was officially adopted in 1997 for the 
purpose of improving the management of public services (Rugumyamheto, 2004). It should 
be noted that for Sub-Saharan African countries, agencification programmes were mainly 
sponsored and diffused by international donor organisations and consulting firms like the 
World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which also facilitated both technical 
and financial support (Larbi, 1998). As McCourt (2008) notes, between 1986 and 1996 the 
World Bank supported public sector reform programmes in no fewer than 68 developing 
countries, the driving ideology being that of creating a smaller and more effective public 
sector. 
 
NPM can be said to have its own benefits but on the other hand Peters (2001) laments that 
NPM has had numerous failings in the developed world and almost certainly even more in 
developing countries where it is being used more and more as an ideological frame for public 
management reforms. It is in this view, Peters (2001) further suggests that governments in 
developing and transitional regimes need to build up their administrative capacities before 
they should consider means of reform and dismantling the rather formalistic systems.              
 
Having reviewed the relevant literature on agencification, next the analytical framework of 
this study is presented. 
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3.7 Analytical Framework 
3.7.1 Introduction 
 
This section presents the study‘s analytical framework as developed from the relevant 
literature reviewed. Section 3.7.2 presents the concept of agency, and section 3.7.3 presents 
the concept of autonomy. Section 3.8 describes the analytical framework for the study. 
  
3.7.2 The Concept of Agency 
 
Agencies are described differently internationally. For example, Roness et al. (2008) reveal 
some of such descriptions as: non-departmental public bodies, hybrids, quangos, fringe 
bodies, non-majoritarian institutions, quasi autonomous public organisations, and distributed 
public governance. The highlighted descriptions clearly mark that there is no universal 
definition of the concept of agency. In attempting to define the concept, Verhoest et al. (2010) 
note that how an agency is defined and what it does varies considerably across nations and in 
different political systems. It is for this reason that Pollitt (2009) admits that since national 
systems of public law are different, it is illusive to get a universally accepted definition of the 
concept of agency. 
  
Pollitt and associates’ give a narrow definition of an agency as a structurally disaggregated 
body, formally separated from the ministry, which carries out public tasks at a national level 
on a permanent basis, it is staffed by public servants, financed mainly by the state budget, and 
is subject to public legal procedures. Agencies have some autonomy from their respective 
ministry in policy decision-making and over personnel, finance, and managerial matters, but 
they are not totally independent, because political executives normally have ultimate political 
responsibility for their activities (Pollitt et al. 2004, Pollitt and Talbot 2004). Contributing to 
the discussion of what an agency is, Smullen (2004) points out that what an agency is and 
what it does vary considerably across national and organisational cultures, legal systems, and 
political systems. However, Christensen and Lægreid (2004) lament that commercial 
corporations are excluded in the agency concept. Therefore, this study adapts the widely used 
definition in literature of the concept of agency as elaborated by Pollitt and associates which 
sheds the elements of an agency as separated from the mother ministry at arm’s length, 
operating at the national level, championed by public servants (not necessarily civil servants), 
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subject to public or administrative law procedures, and mainly depending on state funding. 
This definition outlines the characteristics of an agency and highlights in brief the relation to 
the ministry.  
 
To sum up, an agency according to Pollitt et al. (2004) is an organisation which (i) has its 
status defined principally or exclusively in public law (though the nature of that law may vary 
greatly between different national systems), (ii) is functionally disaggregated from the core of 
its ministry or department of state, (iii) has some degree of autonomy in terms of its 
operations  from the core ministry, (iv) is nevertheless linked to the ministry/department of 
state in ways which are close enough to permit ministers/secretaries of state to alter the 
budgets and main operational goals of the organisation, (v) is therefore not statutorily fully 
independent of its ministry/department of state and, (vi) is not a commercial corporation. 
 
3.7.3 The Concept of Autonomy 
 
Autonomy is a widely, frequently, and diversely used concept in public sector organisation 
(Christensen 2001, Verhoest et al. 2004, Verschuere 2007).  Roness et al. (2008) describe 
autonomy as discretion, or the extent to which the agency can make decisions on itself about 
matters it finds important. Autonomy as decision making power can be grouped into two 
kinds, based on two different scopes of discretion. When agencies have some decision-
making competencies delegated from superior bodies concerning the choice and use of inputs 
they have some degree of managerial autonomy. This includes autonomy with regard to 
human resource management (for instance salary, promotion and evaluation of personnel) and 
financial management (for instance taking loans, setting tariffs and shifting budgets between 
years). The scope of autonomous decision-making capacity may also vary because of the 
structuring of the primary production processes of the agency and the policies themselves. 
The second kind of autonomy is policy autonomy which includes the extent to which the 
agencies can choose the policy instruments. However, in terms of agencies and autonomy, 
Pollitt et al. (2004) point out that in general agencies have some autonomy from the ministry 
but are not fully independent, because the ministry has power to alter the budgets and the 
main goals of the agency. In an attempt to relate autonomy to agencies, Sulle (2010) notes 
that autonomy is a rational concept which should be seen in relation to control from superior 
bodies. 
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The study adapts the widely used definition of the concept of autonomy from Roness et al. 
(2008) as they put it, the degree to which the agency can make its own important decisions 
concerning matters at hand and room to manoeuvre regarding its activities which includes 
both managerial and policy autonomy. 
 
3.8 Specifying the analytical framework for this study 
 
This section of the study focuses on how the main ideas in the literature review can be 
operationalised. Therefore, analytical framework is discussed in detail below.  
 
3.8.1 The analytical point of departure 
 
The analytical framework for this study is derived from the tripod model of agencification. 
The ‘practitioners’ or ‘the tripod model’ represents a standard or an ideal agency model as 
prescribed by the NPM doctrines (Pollitt et al., 2004). In other public management literature, 
the tripod model is also known as tripod of doctrines. The model has three key features 
namely; structural disaggregation, autonomisation, and contractualisation (Pollitt et al., 2004). 
It is in this light that Pollitt et al. (2004) qualify it by pointing out that if an organisation has 
neither of these, then it cannot be classified as an agency, whatever it may be called in its 
local context. Therefore, these three key features from the tripod model are operationalised as 
follows in this framework. 
 
3.8.1.1 Structural disaggregation 
 
This feature reflects emphasizes a removal of a task from the ‘core centre’ to a functionally 
separate unit that is placed at arm’s length from the centre (Pollitt et al., 2004). Fedele et al. 
(2007) view this as a new institutional distance between agencies and their parent ministry. In 
other literature, disaggregation is said to be separateness coupled with a differentiated 
governance structure which allows specialization of functions and a better focus on client 
needs (OECD, 2002). Therefore, structural disaggregation in this analytical framework refers 
to the way the agency was set up as a formal independent body from the parent ministry with 
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its own legal status which outlines its functions and mandate, and as a separate organisation 
with its own name. 
3.8.1.2 Autonomisation 
  
Pollitt et al. (2004) explain disaggregation in depth by making it distinct from a similar term 
‘independence’. In the view of these authors, the term ‘independence’ can be, like the other 
ill-treated term ‘autonomy’, misleading if used inappropriately. Therefore, autonomisation in 
this analytical framework refers to the relationship between the parent ministry and the 
agency but within the governance structure. This involves the three main actors namely; the 
political leadership and administrative leadership of the ministry, the board of the agency, and 
the management of the agency. In this regard, autonomy then would mean that the agency in 
practically is independent of the balance of power between the board and the management of 
the agency and that the agency is autonomised in taking the main decisions with respect to its 
affairs such as personnel, organisation and use of funding.   
 
3.8.1.3 Contractualisation 
 
The third feature is the idea of performance contracting. ‘Performance’ here means any 
system of setting targets for, and reporting on (not necessarily publicly) the activities of an 
agency (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004). Contractualisation in the NPM sense involves replacing 
input-based control with result-based control (Verhoest, 2005). In this regard, the issue of 
control is the main aspect under contractualisation. 
  
The concept of control can be defined as mechanisms used by the government to intentionally 
influence the actions of the agencies so that government objectives are achieved (Verschuere, 
2007). Viewed from a result-based approach, Sulle (2010) points out that the concept of 
control entails a number of administrative procedures. Thompson (1993) distinguishes 
between ex ante control and ex post control mechanisms. The ex ante control focuses on 
inputs and procedures, whilst ex post control is concerned with performance results.  Verhoest 
(2005) adds that ex ante control involves regulations and rules that force agencies to seek 
prior approval before they take action. This may also include the extent to which the oversight 
authority can overrule or nullify a decision already taken by the agency.  
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According to Verhoest et al. (2004) result based control can be considered as a management 
process that consists of interrelated subsystems such as a planning system (setting goals for 
agencies), a monitoring system (measuring agency performance results) and an evaluation 
system (where sanctions and rewards are applied). Therefore, in light of the above, 
contractualisation in this analytical framework refers to the control mechanism regarding the 
setting of performance objectives of the agency and identify the role of agency and the parent 
ministry regarding performance objectives.  
 
3.8.1.4 The three assumptions 
 
This study uses the following three assumptions derived from on the study as an analytical 
point of departure. 
Assumption 1: Structural disaggregation 
 
The structural disaggregation of TEVETA from the parent ministry is formal with the main 
purpose of meeting the local demands of the TEVET sector in the country as a means of 
enhancing service provision. This is in light of Sulle’s (2010) observation that structural 
disaggregation entails that agencies have their separate mandate as described in the 
framework document, have their own public identity and own recognizable separate functions 
and management. 
 
Assumption 2: Autonomisation 
 
TEVETA has a low degree of autonomisation as compared to agencies in developed 
countries. Molander et al. (2002) exemplify that in other countries, like the Scandinavian 
welfare states, public ownership and nationalization were for a long time more popular policy 
tools than regulation and there has been also a long tradition of strong autonomous agencies 
which are responsible for policy implementation and service delivery. 
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Assumption 3: Contractualism 
 
The performance goals of TEVETA are set by the parent ministry as a means of control. 
Christensen and Lægreid (2007) explain that the creation of agencies was expected to result in 
agencies being controlled by results which means that control on inputs is supposed to be 
replaced by result-based control, with parent ministries setting performance goals for 
agencies.  
 
3.8.1.5 Indicators for analysis 
 
In this section the indicators derived from the analytical framework are presented. These 
indicators are grouped in the three key features of agencification as outlined below. 
 
Table 2. Indicators 
 
 
Structural disaggregation 
 Agency establishment as identifiable, separate organisation with its own name. 
 Functions of TEVETA and continuity of the mandate. 
Autonomisation 
 Internal governance structure and the level of freedom concerning internal decision 
making. 
 Funding consistency and source of funding for TEVETA. 
Contractualism 
 Performance objectives setting. 
 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the literature reviewed concerning agencification and the analytical 
framework for the study. Structural disaggregation, autonomisation and contractualism are the 
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three characteristics of agencification which forms the tripod model of agencification. These 
characteristics are found in every agency no matter the social and cultural setting and what the 
agency is called. Structural disaggregation is described as a process whereby a body is 
separated from the parent ministry and has its own legal status, organisation structure and set 
of functions. Autonomisation focuses on the degree of freedom which an agency has 
concerning the managerial and policy aspects while contractualism focuses on the 
performance of the agency and the control mechanism by the government. It is from this 
tripod model of agencification, the analytical framework for this study has been derived. The 
next chapter presents the research methodology of the study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the study design and research methodology that was used to guide the 
process of data collection and analysis. The study applied qualitative method as the research 
strategy due to the nature of research problem and research questions which acts as major 
determinants of the research strategy. In order to have in-depth understanding of the research 
problem and taking into consideration the time factor and available resources, the study 
adapted a case study research design and three in-depth interviews were conducted. 
Interviews were used as instruments of data collection in the sense that this method of data 
collection allows participants to express their opinions and experiences unreservedly. 
Furthermore, purposive sampling was used to select participants for the study in order to 
involve respondents with relevant information in relation to the research problem and research 
questions. 
 
In light of the above, section 4.2 presents the research strategy. Section 4.3 presents the 
research design. In section 4.4 the sampling method and the sample size are presented. Data 
collection instruments are presented in section 4.5 and section 4.6 presents data analysis while 
issues related to the quality of the study are presented in section 4.7. Section 4.8 presents the 
ethic issues and the conclusion is presented in section 4.9. 
 
4.2 Research strategy 
 
A research strategy is a general orientation of conducting social research and the two clusters 
of research strategy are qualitative and quantitative (Bryman, 2008). For the purpose of this 
study the qualitative method has been chosen to investigate the agencification of quality 
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assurance in Zambia. Bryman (2012) describes qualitative research as a strategy that usually 
emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data. 
Qualitative methods demonstrate a different approach to scholarly inquiry than methods of 
quantitative research (Creswell, 2014). Patton (1980) points out that in quantitative research, 
the emphasis is more on answering the why question leading to establishing the cause and 
effects, measuring and quantifying phenomena and generalisations of findings while in 
qualitative research the emphasis is more on answering the what and how questions, meaning 
and understanding of phenomena and situating the findings in a particular context. In an 
attempt to differentiate the quantitative and qualitative researcher, Bryman (2008) contributes 
that quantitative researchers are often preoccupied with applying measurement to procedures 
of social life, whilst the qualitative researcher is often preoccupied with the usage of words in 
the presentation of analyses of society. 
The decision for preference of the research strategy to apply in any study depends on the type 
of the required data. It is in this light that the preferred strategy acts as a guide on how data 
will be collected and analysed and how the findings will be presented. Therefore, the rationale 
for adopting the qualitative research strategy in this study is to get in-depth understanding of 
agencification of quality assurance in Zambia. The method enables one to draw on 
unquantifiable but rich, that is, comprehensive and in-depth data that help to deeply 
understand the phenomena (Anderson, 1998).  
4.3 Research design 
 
A research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 
2012). To address the research questions of this study, the study adopted the case study 
design. As Stake (1995) observes, case study research is concerned with the complexity and 
particular nature of the case in question. In this regard it can be pointed out that this approach 
will enable the researcher to be familiar and understand the problem in realistic terms. 
Different scholars in research have described case study method in various ways. Yin (2009: 
4) stresses that “… case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real life events such-as Individual life cycles, small group 
behaviour, organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, school 
performance ….” 
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Yin (2003) reveals that there are various case study designs namely: exploratory, descriptive 
and explanatory. Yin describes the three as follows; Exploratory case studies may be applied 
in situations in which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes 
whilst descriptive a case study aims at describing and observing everything related to the 
phenomenon of interest without influencing it in any way. Explanatory case studies are driven 
by the need to answer the ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions in an area of interest for the purpose of 
explaining the presumed causal links in real - life interventions that are too complex for the 
survey or experimental strategies. Therefore, this study adopted the explanatory case study 
design to address the ‘how’ question as indicated in the problem statement and to further help 
the researcher link the development of TEVETA and agencification. 
  
4.4 Sampling method and sample size 
 
The study used purposive sampling which is categorised under non probability sampling of 
the participants. The goal of purposive sampling according to Bryman (2012) is to sample 
cases or participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research 
questions that are being posed. Therefore, the researcher does not seek to sample the 
respondents on a random basis. The reason of using this type of sampling as noted by 
Manning (2000) is to enable the person doing a study experience a multitude of points of 
view on an issue being studied. 
The study involved three (3) key participants purposely selected from TEVETA and 
MESVTEE. The composition of the participants is that two officers were from TEVETA and 
one officer from the MESVTEE. The participants were purposively selected because they 
were known to have knowledge deemed relevant for the study. 
4.5 Data collection instruments 
  
In this study semi – structured interviews and document review were the means of data 
collection.  The research interview is a prominent data – collection strategy in both 
quantitative and qualitative studies (Bryman, 2012). An interview as defined by Silverman 
(2004) is an interaction between the researcher and the respondents in which both participants 
create and construct the narrative versions of the social reality. 
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The researcher conducted face - to - face interviews with two participants and one telephone 
phone interview which was as a result of limited time to organise for the face to face 
interview. These interviews  were unstructured and generally based on open ended questions 
which allowed the participants to express their opinions and experiences freely. Kvale and 
Brinkmann (2009: 2) stress that a research interview is based on conversations of daily life 
and is a professional conversation where knowledge is constructed in the inter-action between 
the interviewer and the interviewee … an interchange of views between two persons 
conversing about a theme of mutual respect. 
Creswell (2014: 190) expounds that during the process of research, the researcher may collect 
qualitative documents. The term document in the social sciences is defined differently by 
various scholars. A sociologist, for example, (Altheide, 1996: 2), described a document as any 
symbolic representation that can be recorded or retrieved for analysis. The researcher 
reviewed document literature such as TEVETA reports, pamphlets, strategic reports and 
TEVETA news from TEVETA to supplement the information which was gathered in the 
interviews. 
4.6 Data analysis 
 
Bryman (2012) notes that the process of coding is a crucial stage in the process of data 
analysis. The data analysis activity consisted of transcribing and coding relevant responses 
which addressed the research questions. In qualitative research, Bryman (2012) points out that 
coding is the process whereby data are broken down into components parts, which are given 
names. The researcher transcribed and coded the participants’ responses and extracted 
relevant information which was directly addressing the research questions and taking into 
consideration the importance of the findings to the research problem. The three participants of 
the study are protected in line with the ethical issues of research in accordance with Bryman 
(2012) by naming the officer from the MESVTEE as officer from Ministry and two officers 
from TEVETA as 1
st
 officer from TEVETA and 2
nd
 officer from TEVETA.  
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4.7 Validity and Reliability 
 
The most prominent criteria for judging quality of social research are reliability, replication 
and validity (Bryman, 2012). Bryman (2012: 715 - 717) describes them as follows; Reliability 
is concerned with the question of whether a measure of a concept is stable whilst replication 
which is mostly valued in quantitative research and is concerned with the degree to which the 
results of the study can be reproduced. Validity is concerned with the integrity of the 
conclusions that are generated from one piece of research.  Kleven (2007) affirms Bryman’s 
definition of validity as an approximate truth of inference. 
 
Apart from the above criteria, Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose that alternative terms and 
ways of assessing qualitative research are required. For example, they propose trustworthiness 
as a criterion of how good a qualitative study is. Each aspect of trustworthiness has a parallel 
with the quantitative research criteria. (i) Credibility, which parallels internal validity - that is, 
how believable are the findings? (ii) Transferability, which parallels external validity – that is, 
do the findings apply to other contexts? (iii) Dependability, which parallels reliability – that 
is, are the findings likely to apply at other times? (iv) Confirmability, which parallels 
objectivity - that is, has the investigator allowed his or her values to intrude to a high degree? 
 
Therefore, to ensure trustworthiness in this study, the researcher carefully designed the data 
collection instruments and used purposive sampling to select the relevant appropriate 
respondents for the study. In additional, appropriate relevant documents were carefully 
chosen for the study. Bryman (2012: 717) describes triangulation as the use of more than one 
method or source of data in the study of a social phenomenon so that findings maybe cross 
checked. To enhance validity, the data which was collected through interviews was 
complemented by documents which were analyzed. 
 
4.8 Ethical issues 
 
Ethnical issues arise at a variety of stages in social research. Ethical issues cannot be ignored, 
as they relate directly to the integrity or a piece of research and of the disciplines that are 
involved (Bryman, 2012). Literature in research reveals that ethnical principles in social 
research revolve around certain issues that are broken down by Diener and Crandall (1978) 
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into four main areas, namely: whether there is harm to participants, lack of informed consent, 
and invasion of privacy, and whether deception is involved. 
In order to uphold the ethical principles in this study, the identity and positions of the 
participants have been kept confidential. Bryman (2012: 136) explains that the issue of harm 
of participants in the ethical codes advocates care over maintaining the confidentiality of 
records meaning that identities and records of individuals should be maintained as 
confidential.  
In addition, the researcher wrote to TEVETA requesting to conduct a study from there and 
used a letter from the University of Oslo’s Department of Education for introductory 
purposes. This is in accordance with the issue of lack of informed consent. In the view of 
Bryman (2012: 138), this principle means that prospective research participants should be 
given as much information as might be needed to make informed decision about whether or 
not they wish to participate in the study. 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the research design and methodology for the study. The research 
methodology discussed in this chapter was selected and applied in this study based on its 
relevance to address the research problem and research questions. The study applied a 
qualitative research approach and a case study research design. In addition, purposive 
sampling was employed to select participants for the study and interviews were the means of 
data collection.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: PRESENTATION AND 
ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and interprets the findings of the study obtained through document 
analysis and interviews in view of the analytical framework and identified indicators of the 
study presented in the third chapter. The research questions which were introduced in chapter 
one are as follows: 
 
1. What was the main rationale for setting up TEVETA? 
2. How is TEVETA organised and governed? 
3. How has the funding of TEVETA developed since its establishment? 
4. What are the main internal and external change drivers of TEVETA?  
 
5.2 Research findings and interpretations 
5.2.1 Structural disaggregation 
5.2.1.1 Agency establishment as identifiable, separate 
organisation with its own name 
 
A process of reconsidering the policy and institutional framework for the TEVET subsector 
got underway in 1994. The TEVET Policy (1996) stated that the TEVET system needed to be 
highly responsive to employment patterns of the economy hence the enactment of the TEVET 
Act of 1998 by the government which led to the creation of entrepreneurship and informal 
sector training and the creation of TEVETA. The TEVET Act of 1998 was reviewed and 
TEVET Act No. 11 of 2005 was enacted. TEVETA holds the main function, including that of 
accreditations body of both public and private higher education institutions regarding to the 
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curricula and standard of the programmes. In addition, the agency works hand in hand with 
the institutions for the purpose of safeguarding acceptable levels of academic and professional 
standards in the TEVET sector in Zambia.  
 
When the TEVET reforms were instituted, TEVET institutions were placed under 
management boards as a result one of the reforms after the dissolution of the DTEVT. The 
dissolution of DTEVT sees the birth of TEVETA. The 1
st
 officer from TEVETA had this to 
say as the reason for the establishment of TEVETA: 
 
“One of the main reasons for establishing TEVETA was the change in the environment 
especially from the centralized provision of Technical Education Vocational Training to one 
which is liberalised attracting other players apart from government then hopefully that was 
hoped that the training system will cater for everybody.” 
TEVETA was established as a separate entity from the ministry following the liberalisation of 
the economy in the early 1990’s. At this time it was no longer the preserve of government 
institutions to provide Technical and Vocational Training which was then tailored to meet the 
needs of the parastatal companies. Therefore, with the increased private sector participation in 
the economy that came with diverse skills requirements, it became necessary to create a 
structure and organisation for TEVET in Zambia, which would provide the necessary 
flexibility and relevance in training to meet Zambia’s emerging labour market demands. 
Hence a national training authority was established identifiable in the name of TEVETA 
separate at arm’s length from the MESVTEE. The 1st officer from TEVETA confirmed this as 
follows: 
 
“… having now unpacked the policy statement which was allowing for anybody to provide 
TEVET, both public and as well as private sector players. Then it was agreed that in line with 
other economic liberalisation policies then the training sector also needed to be liberalised so 
that apart from Government, the private sector can also come in hence the creation of a 
separate authority to oversee the sector.” 
 
In 2000, DTEVT was dissolved and was replaced by TEVETA. With the dissolution of 
DTVET, the 23 institutions which it managed were placed under management boards. The 
Department of Vocational Education and Training (DVET) in the Ministry of Science, 
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Technology and Vocational Training was created to formulate, monitor and evaluate the 
TEVET Policy. The department also promotes TEVET and assesses the impact of TEVET 
programmes. The department has two units namely Entrepreneurship and Skills units 
(Konayuma, 2008). Another function of the department is to increase stakeholder 
participation in the provision of TEVET. Before the TVET reforms that started in the 1990s, 
TVET provision was mostly done by public institutions. Currently TVET provision is also 
done by private institutions, faith based organisations, trusts and community based 
institutions. The officer from the ministry had this to say concerning the purpose of 
government establishing TEVETA as a separate entity: 
 
“As a co-side government institution and as you may wish to know the government 
established TEVETA with an expectation of supervising, regulating and also conducting 
examinations in the all TEVET sector in the country. When we talk of TEVETA, TEVETA does 
not own institutions, it’s just a regulator. It regulates the TEVET sector both public and 
private”.  
 
5.2.1.2 Functions and continuity of the Mandate of 
TEVETA 
 
The Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Act (No.13 of 1998), 
and amended by Act No. 11 of 2005 provides that TEVETA shall: (i) facilitate the 
development of technical capacity in institutions established or registered under this Act; (ii) 
develop national curricula in consultation with stakeholders; (iii) set minimum standards and 
qualifications for any occupation, skill, technology or trade in accordance with trends in 
industry; (iv) provide guidelines for the development of institutional curricula; (v) accredit 
local and foreign examinations to be taken by persons attending courses at an institution 
established or registered under this Act; and (vi) charge and collect fees in respect of 
examinations, assessments and other services provided by the Authority. 
 
TEVETA has many functions including to: (a) advise the Minister on TEVET in Zambia; (b) 
regulate and advise Management Boards; (c) development and review of national curricula; 
(d) regulate and conduct examinations related to TEVET (e) trades testing (f) registration and 
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inspection of both public and private TEVET institutions. In addition to these functions, 
Nkanza (2003) states that the mandate for TEVETA is to regulate, coordinate and monitor 
TEVT in consultation with the industry, lawyers’, employers, employees and other 
stakeholders. The officer from the ministry puts the mandate as follows: 
 
“Its original mandate is to help supervise, to help regulate and examine programs that are of 
TEVET nature, those are its initial mandate to help regulate, supervise and to help manage. 
So it’s about supervision and it’s about regulation, for example TEVETA registers all TEVET 
institutions in the country, in respect whether they are government or private”. 
 
In light of the above functions and mandate, TEVETA was given an additional function in 
2005 of managing the TEVET Fund for the purpose of sustaining training. Mukuni (2014) 
indicates that as one of the key outputs of the TEVET Development Programme, the TEVET 
Fund was established through the TEVET (amendment) Act (number 11 of 2005), which 
provided for the Fund to be managed by TEVETA. According to the Act, the Fund consists 
of:  
a) Such monies as may be appropriated by Parliament for purposes of the TEVET Fund;  
b) Such monies as may be paid to the Fund by way of loans, grants or donations;  
c) Such percentage of the registration, examination, assessment and other fees payable to 
TEVETA as the Minister may determine in consultation with the Authority;  
d) Subject to the approval of the Minister responsible for finance, such monies as may be paid 
to the Fund from any levy which may be imposed and collected for purposes of TEVET.  
 
5.2.1.3 Discussion of the findings on structural 
disaggregation 
 
In light of the above, it is therefore true to argue that the establishment of TEVETA is not a 
different case from other Sub-Saharan African countries which have experienced the wave of 
NPM driven by the similar ideology behind agencification. In the public management 
literature, agencification in developing countries has been pointed out to be sponsored by 
international donor organisations, such as the World Bank and IMF. For instance, 
Rugumyamheto (2004) indicates that Tanzania, a neighbouring country to Zambia, adopted 
40 
 
the agency programme in the 1997 with the sole purpose of improving the management of 
public services provisions, a development which was mainly supported by the major donors 
like the IMF and World Bank. Zambia is not an exception in this; the findings of this study 
have revealed that the establishment of TEVETA is a result of a similar ideology behind 
agencification and the support of the Brentwood institutions such as the World Bank and 
IMF. The officer from the Ministry confirms this as follows: 
“The main objective of government establishing TEVETA is first of all the product of the 
TEVET reforms of the 1990s which was the consequence of multi-lateral pressure from the 
Brentwood institutions like the IMF and the World Bank and other multi-lateral institutions”. 
On the other hand, the establishment of TEVETA can be said to be in line with Pollitt et al.’s 
(2004) argument that one of the reasons of creating agencies is to put public services closer to 
their users. Pollitt et al.’s observation agrees with the revelation of the findings that the 
government ceased to be the sole provider of TEVET due to reasons such as high demand of 
TEVET in the country hence there was increase in stakeholders’ participation following the 
liberalisation of the economy. This also can be linked to Christensen and Lægreid (2007) who 
point out that the rise of agencies can be traced from the strains noted by governments, such 
as work overload to the civil service and ministries resulting in insufficient attention to 
service delivery. In this regard, this can be associated to the issue of effectiveness and 
efficiency which has been revealed by public management literature as one of the reasons for 
agency creation. 
However, another line of thought concerning the establishment of such an agency can be 
associated to be in line with the views of the contingency approach (March and Olsen, 1989). 
It is under the contingency approach that Trondal and Egeberg (2013) point out that the 
decision of agency creation is triggered by the particular circumstances of the moment. 
However, elaborating the detailed assessment regarding the contingency approach is beyond 
this study due to that the contingency approach has not been captured in the analytical 
framework for the study. Nevertheless, it can be safe in this regard to point out that 
government was responding to the need of national labour market demand of diverse skills 
and improve the provision of public services by assisting technical training providers both 
private and public in the country. The findings indicate that the establishment of such an 
institution proves valid the elements of agencification as elaborated by Pollitt and Talbot 
(2004) of which TEVETA is an identifiable separate organisation, with its own mandate and 
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name since it was established with a clear statutory document through the act of parliament 
which led to its establishment. 
 
Agencies are established with various specific purposes and the mandate of TEVETA is 
evident of such. This is in agreement with the report by the Public Service Commission 
(2012) that agencies are established with various expectations, such as the improvement of 
the performance of government, whether through their policy advice, regulatory role, or 
service delivery, depending on why they were established in the first place. The 1st officer 
from TEVETA confirmed this as follows: 
 
“The original mandate for TEVETA has not changed since the time of its establishment. By 
law, the original mandate for TEVETA is to regulate, coordinate and monitor TEVT in 
consultation with the industry, lawyers’, employers, employees and other stakeholders. This 
has been the general function of TEVETA from the time it was established”. 
 
This response by the interviewee marks a good point of concern regarding the mandate and 
raises the question whether TEVETA fulfils its mandate effectively. This is especially 
relevant from the perspective of the revelation of the study that the TEVET sector has 
expanded whilst the interviewee indicate that the mandate is still the same since TEVETA 
was established although an additional function to manage the TEVET Fund has been added 
to its initial functions. However, giving a detailed analysis in this regard is beyond this study 
in part due to that the study focused on the rationale for setting up TEVETA. Again, the major 
stakeholders, the TEVET institutions were not captured, as part of the sample of the study. 
 
5.3 Autonomisation 
5.3.1 Internal governance structure and the level of 
freedom concerning internal decision making 
 
Governance is about the frameworks in which organisations manage themselves and about the 
processes and structures used to achieve the intended outcomes – in other words it is about 
how organisations operate (Maassen, 2003). TEVETA is governed by a board appointed by 
the Minister responsible for Vocational Education and Training in accordance with Section 6 
(1) of the Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training (Amendment) Act 
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No. 11 of 2005. The initial act of 1998 provided for 21 board members and it was the biggest 
board since the establishment of TEVETA. In 2005, the act was revised and the number of the 
board members dropped from 21 to 11. The major reason for the reduction in the number of 
board members was that it was too big and one of the discussions was that it was costly. The 
board members normally serve a term of 3 years.  
 
The first board of 21 members was appointed in July 1999 and this board served up to around 
2006 while the 11 members that started – in 2006 served up to around 2011. Recently the 
number of the board members has been reduced to 10 following the merging of the Ministry 
of Education and the Ministry of Science Technology and Vocational Training
11
, hence only 
one permanent secretary has the mandate to sit on the board representing government. 
Previously, both permanent secretaries of the two ministries had the mandate to sit on the 
board. 
 
The board consists of representation from various stakeholders namely: a representative of a 
federation of trade unions; a representative of the Zambia Association of Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry; one representative from a University established under the 
University Act; a representative from a federation of employers’ organisations; a 
representative of the Zambia Chamber for Small and Medium Business Associations; a 
representative of a research and development institution established under the Science and 
Technology Act; a representative of a religious organisation involved in providing Technical 
Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training; a representative of the Ministry 
responsible for TEVET; a representative of the Ministry responsible for labour;  a 
representative of the Ministry responsible for education; and one other extra board member. 
The members elect a Chairperson and a Vice Chairperson from among themselves. In terms 
of organisation, the board has three committees regarding to its activities and these are: 
Finance and administration committee, TEVET fund committee and Technical committee 
(TEVETA, 2010).  
 
TEVETA is organised in four divisions and these divisions are headed by directors who report 
to the office of the Director General and the Director General is also an automatic member 
                                                 
11
 The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science Technology and Vocational Training were merged in 
2012 to form MESVTEE (https://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/02/28/president-sata-effects-cabinet/). 
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(secretary) of the board. The four divisions are as follows: (i) The Training Standards 
Division which holds the responsibility for registration and accreditation; (ii) The 
Development Division which is responsible for curricula and training system development 
and currently this division is also responsible for TEVET research and innovation 
responsibility; (iii) the Assessment and Qualifications Division which is responsible for the 
assessment and certification of the examinations ran by TEVETA; and  (iv) the Finance and 
Administration Division which holds the regulatory functions. The 1
st
 officer from TEVETA 
confirmed the following as the regulatory function: 
“… (a) They anchor the information education and communication function and that is the 
first line of regulation with the purpose to make people aware that a training institution 
cannot be run without registration. (b) They also anchor the training fund from the TEVET 
fund - under the revised law in 2005, TEVETA was given an additional function to be 
manager of the TEVET fund”.  
The TEVET fund plays an important role in helping the GRZ to develop a high quality, 
sustainable, demand - driven, and equitable TEVET system. The fund establishes a financing 
platform that purchases training services from the public and private providers on a 
competitive basis, supports training of workers by enterprises, and finances infrastructure, 
equipment, and capacity building to upgrade training institutions. In the availability of 
resources from the government or partners, TEVETA manages those in line with the 
agreement made with the government to provide specific training outcomes. Basically, that 
fund is used by TEVETA to purchase training services from registered training providers in 
line with the funding priorities (TEVETA, 2006).  
TEVETA has about forty members of staff and these are employed based on their 
qualifications. The staffs at TEVETA are employed on renewable contracts and the 
responsibility of employing is one of the tasks of the board. MESVTEE as a parent ministry 
oversees the operations of TEVETA by putting the board in place and this defines the 
TEVETA ministry relationship. The officer from the ministry had this to say regarding 
TEVETA ministry relationship: 
 
“The relationship between the ministry and TEVETA is that TEVETA is the subset of this 
ministry, it reports to this ministry and to the permanent secretary of this ministry.” 
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5.3.2 Funding consistency and sources of funding for 
TEVETA 
 
The TEVET system in Zambia is financed through a variety of sources: (i) Government 
provide funding to public TVET institutions through the relevant ministries. Funds are used to 
subsidise training fees and for operational costs of TVET institutions. (ii) Charities and 
donors ensure funding for community-based and faith-based TVET providers. Those 
organisations subsidise TVET training for socio-economically disadvantaged learners. (iii) 
Training fees are a significant source of funding for both public and private TVET providers. 
However, fees charged by private institutions are not regulated while public TVET 
institutions need to seek approval for training fees from the corresponding ministries. (iv) 
Industry provides funding for enterprise-based training allowing students to train directly at 
the workplace. (v) Established under the TVET (Amendment) Act. No. 11 of 2005, the 
TEVET Fund serves as a source of funding for public and private providers. The Government 
provides funds for the TEVET Fund which is consequently awarded to pre-determined 
training programmes at public training institutions (UNESCO-UNEVOC, 2010). The 
following interview response by the 1
st
 officer from TEVETA confirms this: 
 
“The main source of funding at TEVETA is the government through the Ministry of Finance 
which gives the sealing. The government also decides on how TEVETA should fund its 
activities. This funding is supplemented with regulatory fees, occasional donor funding with 
their projects although currently this has become erratic in the TEVET sector”. 
TEVET’s strategic paper (2007) revealed that government budgetary allocations for financing 
TEVET was increasingly inadequate, and even if additional funds were made available, 
government alone could not meet the costs of financing TEVET. The TEVET sector in the 
country is expanding yearly. In 2002, there were 231 TVET institutions registered, in 2004 
there were 314, and in 2006 there were 351 (Mukuni, 2014). TEVETA, on the other hand 
supplements government funding through the services it offers and this includes those 
associated with conducting examinations, the registration of training institutions, and the 
accreditation of examiners, assessors and trainers. The budget of TEVETA has also received 
support from cooperating partners towards specific programmes and objectives. Management 
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at TEVETA through the appropriate and technical channels are in constant process of 
lobbying to the government for increase in funding to the agency. 
 
In order to redeem this funding challenge, TEVETA is planning to increase access to TEVET 
so that there can be an increase in the number of learners in the TEVET sector. This will be 
done by coming up with a training system which will promote different path - ways to have 
many learners into the system. The rationale behind this intent is that there can be an increase 
in the regulatory fees and this will also give an opportunity to more people to attain training. 
The expectation with this initiative is that extra funds will be generated by what learners pay 
and perhaps government can also take note and grant more support to such efforts. This is 
what the 2nd officer from TEVETA had to say concerning the level of funding at TEVETA: 
 
“The current level of funding for TEVETA is insufficient for TEVETA to be able to achieve its 
goals and many instances we have not been able to implement some of our planned activities 
due to lack of financing”. 
 
5.3.3 Discussion of the findings on autonomisation 
 
The revelation of the study is that TEVETA has its own separate system of governance from 
MESVTEE. From the findings, it has been noted that the board of TEVETA is an instrument 
of the government whose influence trickles down to the management of TEVETA although it 
is structural separated from the parent ministry with its own internal structure and system of 
governance. This can be referred to as ‘conditional autonomy’ where the agency needs 
approval from the parent ministry through the board of the agency in order to undertake 
activities as compared to real autonomy where this approval would not be necessary. This is 
in the light of the decisions concerning the managerial issues, budgetary issues and members 
of staff which are in the hands of the board, is the members of which are appointed by and 
acts on behalf of the government. This low level of managerial autonomy at TEVETA cannot 
be compared to the degree of autonomy which agencies in developed countries, such as in 
Sweden and the UK, experience as pointed out by Pollitt et al. (2004). However, the 
conditional autonomy at TEVETA is similar to what is happening in other developing 
countries such as in Tanzania as revealed by Sulle (2010) who has noted that agencies in 
Tanzania have quite low both managerial and operational autonomy. Again, this is also what 
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is happening in Ghana as revealed by Kwasi-Agyeman (2015) who concluded that the 
GETFund has insufficient autonomy and the board is an instrument of the government. 
Giving that examining the detailed rationale behind the conditional autonomy at TEVETA is 
beyond this study which implies that such examination requires another study. However, it 
can be associated to Christensen and Lægreid’s (2005) observation that this may be seen as a 
blame avoidance strategy for politicians by shifting responsibility for policy failure to 
bureaucrats and experts. 
 
The way in which TEVETA is governed is not very different from what is happening in other 
developing countries where agencies have their own governing boards, even though the 
composition of these boards can be different from one country to another, and this can also be 
noted at the GETFund (Kwasi-Agyeman, 2015). TEVETA is being governed by the board 
which is the employer of the staff and it is appointed by the Minister. Furthermore, the 
permanent secretary of the parent ministry is also a member of the TEVETA board, which 
explains the mechanism used by government to intentionally influence the actions of the 
agency as Verschuere (2007) puts it. Therefore, it can be safe to argue that the staff at 
TEVETA is employed by the Ministry indirectly through the board which functions on behalf 
of the government. It is in this line of thought that it can be interpreted that the Ministry has 
indirect influence in the operations of TEVETA through the board as it is the one which 
appoints it in place and it has its own space on the same board. The following response from 
the 2
nd
 officer from TEVETA is an excellent illustration of what has been discussed above: 
 
“The Ministry has an influence on the decisions at TEVETA in the sense that the governing 
board of TEVETA is appointed by the Ministry and supports its operational cost, especially in 
the area of assessments”. 
 
This also is in line with the findings of Kwasi-Agyeman (2015) that the government in Ghana 
interferes with the work of GETFund by appointing the agency’s senior members. This is also 
in some respects in line with the work of Molander et al. (2002) who revealed that, as an 
outcome of the problems, Swedish politicians turned to other means of dealing with the power 
of agencies. Therefore, the above explanation indicates the link between TEVETA and the 
Ministry proving Braun’s (2008) observation that an agency does not exist in isolation but it 
is interconnected with other institutional levels, and agencies are the implementers of the 
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decisions made at the Ministerial level. However, this places TEVETA at a difficult position 
in terms of its operations. This can be confirmed by the following response of the officer from 
the Ministry: 
 
“We as government own public TEVET institutions but TEVETA which operates under this 
ministry supervises both public and private institutions … and this is where the trick part 
comes in because TEVETA will find it very difficult to go and close a public TEVET 
institution when it does not meet the stipulated required standards. If it means closing a 
public institution, then TEVETA is closing the government but the issue is that most of the 
government institutions would have met the minimum standards, because government is 
large.” 
 
In light of the above, financial autonomy is another aspect under autonomisation which can be 
argued to be quite low at TEVETA. This can be noted in the insufficient funding to TEVETA 
which cannot even match the current demands of the TEVET sector in the country. In 
addition, it can be noted in the findings that TEVETA has limited authority to make decisions 
concerning funds, as this is the responsibility of the government through the Ministry of 
Finance. The findings indicate that the government is not only the main funder but also holds 
the responsibility of approving the budget of TEVETA. This situation is contrary to Verhoest 
et al. (2004) who point out that agencies are free to make their own decisions including on 
financial aspects. The low level of financial autonomy at TEVETA is a similar case to what is 
happening at GETFund as revealed by Kwasi-Agyemen (2015) who pointed out that 
GETFund has insufficient financial autonomy. 
 
The insufficient and inconsistent funding to meet the current TEVET national demands can be 
noted in the budgetary allocation by the government. For instance, an investigation in the 
national budget of 2015 at TEVETA indicated that the education sector as a whole in the 
country was allocated 20.20 % of the total national budget and out of that only 0.20 % was 
allocated to the TEVET sector. The latter represents a very minimal amount given especially 
that the TEVET sector is expanding yearly. This can be confirmed by the following excellent 
response from the 2
nd
 officer at TEVETA: 
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“The annual funding to TEVET has been stable but insufficient over the years. Similarly, the 
grant to TEVETA has been insufficient and sometimes not consistent. As a result, we have not 
implemented our budgets as planned”. 
 
Therefore, it can be safe to argue that the level of funding of TEVETA has not grown 
proportional to meeting the demands of the sector. This affects the operations of TEVETA in 
terms of achieving all the set goals due to insufficient funding. Again, it can be argued that 
TEVETA does not fulfil its mandate fully nation wide due to the inability of implementing 
the budget as a result of inadequate funds as indicated by the interviewees’ response.  
 
Therefore, the revelation of this study is not only similar to what is happening in Ghana at the 
GETFund, but this is also what is happening in other Sub-Saharan African countries such as 
Tanzania as revealed by Sulle (2010) who points out that agencies in Tanzania have quite low 
financial autonomy and operate in situations of insufficient resources. 
 
5.4 Contractualisation 
5.4.1 Performance objective setting and reporting 
 
The management of TEVETA has been charged with the responsibility to develop operational 
policies, procedures and guidelines, but once developed these have to be approved by the 
TEVETA board before they can be used in practice. However, practices that need to be 
escalated to regulations are presented to the Minister who may issue them in the form of a 
Statutory Instrument for enforcement.  
 
In terms of operation, each division at TEVETA has the responsibility to set its own strategic 
objectives and works towards the achievement of such objectives with the use of set 
indicators for each objective. For instance, the overall objective according to the current 
TEVETA Strategic plan (2014 - 2016) is “to promote access to TEVET and facilitate 
significant growth in annual enrolments and graduation rates by December 2015, while 
ensuring World class quality, equity and system efficiency and effectiveness”. The overall 
Strategic Plan objective is then executed within the legislative context and prevailing 
divisional structures of TEVETA and each division sets objectives towards the achievement 
of this general one. 
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In terms of performance reporting, the specialists in each division report to managers and 
these managers report to the division directors. Thereafter, it is the responsibility of these 
division directors to report to the Director General of TEVETA about the performance in the 
divisions. TEVETA holds the responsibility of drawing its own work plan and the budget 
which is subjected for approval to the board. Once the approval is done by the board, then it is 
submitted to the government who later consolidates and submits it to parliament. When the 
approval is done by parliament, the board of TEVETA then ensures that management acts and 
does the implementation process.  
 
5.4.2 Discussion of the findings on contractualisation 
 
The revelation of the study is that TEVETA holds the responsibility of setting performance 
objectives. However, the Ministry which is at the higher level as illustrated by Braun (2008: 
232) in the institutional matrix of political governance, is involved in day to day decision 
making about the implementation of the activities and grants approval to the formulated 
performance objectives or strategic plans, the fees and the budget by TEVETA. This is a type 
of control known as ex ante control as identified by Verhoest (2005) where the agency seeks 
approval pre undertaking any action. This is not only happening at TEVETA, Sulle (2012) 
observed in Tanzania that most of the agencies have dominated the process of setting their 
own performance goals, however, the centre has continued to retain power over various 
aspects of human resources management, rendering agencies less autonomous over 
operational matters. In this regard, the revelation of this study indicates a different situation 
compared to Christensen and Lægreid’s (2007) observation that the parent ministries set 
performance goals for agencies for the purpose of control. The following is an excellent 
response by the 2
nd
 officer from TEVETA confirming what has been discussed above: 
 
“ … based on the policy objectives as issued by Government, TEVETA develops a strategic 
plan in which it sets performance targets and government approves TEVETA’s strategic and 
annual work plans and budgets”. 
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This action by the government is also similar to what is happening in Ghana. The study by 
Kwasi-Agyeman (2015) revealed that the government uses the legal framework to control 
the GETFund when it comes to monitoring. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, the findings of the study have been presented and analyzed. This has been 
done by the use of the analytical framework and identified indicators of the study. The study 
reveals that the establishment of TEVETA is associated to the TEVET reforms of the 1990s 
and was structural disaggregated from the parent ministry following the liberalisation of the 
economy to meet the local needs. Its original mandate has not changed since its establishment 
which is to help supervise, regulate and manage the TEVET sector in the country. However, it 
was given an additional function of managing the TEVET Fund in 2005. Further, the study 
has revealed that the level of autonomisation at TEVET is low in the sense that the board at 
TEVETA is not as independent as it should be but it is an instrument of the government, and 
the parent ministry holds the responsibility of approving the activities before the agency 
undertakes the implementation process. Again, the level of funding to TEVETA is 
inconsistent and insufficient to the extent where the budget is sometimes not implemented 
fully and the government is the major source of funding. In regards to contractualism, 
TEVETA holds the responsibility of setting the performance objectives, however, these 
require approval from the board. The next chapter presents the conclusions of the findings. 
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CHAPTER SIX:                CONCLUSIONS                                    
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The current agencification process is connected to NPM and it is an international trend which 
is in fashion. The ideology of NPM and associated reforms has spread across the globe and 
this study focused on the public management dynamics in Africa, more specifically, in the 
Zambian context. This study has contributed to the literature concerning this subject from the 
African perspective where this subject has not much been studied as much when compared to 
developed countries. It is in this vein that the findings of this study have made reference also 
to agencification in Tanzania and Ghana to contribute to the understanding of agencification 
in the Sub-Saharan African perspective as compared to the agencification in the developed 
countries.  
6.2 Conclusion 
6.2.1 Research question 1 
What was the main rationale for setting up TEVETA? 
The public management literature raises an argument that agencies were established for 
various reasons and the current importance of agencification in public management practices 
around the world can be related to NPM. The empirical data in the fifth chapter has revealed 
many issues concerning the establishment of TEVETA. TEVETA is a product of the TEVET 
reforms of the 1990s which swept across the nation and the region. This was supported by 
Brentwood’s institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. Further, the results have shown 
that the commercial pressure in the country to change the vocational training system in terms 
of skills development led to the establishment of TEVETA. An important rationale in this was 
the intention to change the role of the government from being the central providers of TEVT 
to the one which liberalised the sector and hence attracted various new providers. Following 
the liberalisation of the economy, TEVETA was established as a separate entity to meet the 
needs of the local environment and the parastatal companies hence government shifting the 
responsibility by setting up a separate entity. It is evident that TEVETA was formally 
established under the TEVET act no. 13 of 1998 and amended by act no. 11 of 2005. Its 
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mandate is to regulate, coordinate and monitor the TEVET sector in consultation with the 
stakeholders in the country. This was its original mandate upon its establishment and still 
forms the core of the mandate for the agency.    
Therefore, in light of the above findings regarding the establishment of TEVETA, it can be 
concluded that the assumption number one presented in the third chapter on structural 
disaggregation of TEVETA from the parent Ministry is corroborated. The assumption states 
that the structural disaggregation of TEVETA from the parent ministry is formal with the 
main purpose of meeting the local demands of the TEVET sector in the country as a means of 
enhancing service provision. Although this is the main conclusion concerning the 
establishment of TEVETA, it cannot be denied that other factors also contributed to the 
establishment of TEVETA. From the findings and the discussion, this study argues that the 
setting up of TEVETA is not a different case from what has happened in most other Sub-
Saharan African countries and TEVETA displays most of the elements of agencification. 
6.2.2 Research question 2 
How is TEVETA organised and governed? 
It is evident from the study that TEVETA is governed by its board of directors whose 
members currently add up to ten and they serve tenure of three years. The board members are 
appointed by the Minister of MESVTEE in accordance to the TEVET act. This board is 
composed of various stakeholders and it is organised in three committees namely the Finance 
and administration committee, TEVET fund committee, and the Technical committee. The 
study has also shown that TEVETA is hierarchical structured and organised in four divisions. 
These divisions are finance and administration division, development division, assessment 
and qualification division, and training standards divisions. Each of these divisions has its 
own specific functions and is headed by a division director.  
The analysis of the governance and organisation of TEVETA leads to the conclusion that 
TEVETA has limited space to manoeuvre concerning its activities hence signalling low 
degree of managerial autonomy. The Ministry has granted TEVETA the space to draw the 
work plan and the budget. However, these are subjected to the approval of the Ministry hence 
referring to it as ‘conditional autonomy’. Therefore, the study, results and the discussion of 
the study suggests that the Ministry is an instrument of the government which has influence 
on TEVETA through the board it puts in place by means of ex ante control. In light of the 
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above, the study has concluded that assumption number two on autonomisation is 
corroborated. The assumption states that TEVETA has a low degree of autonomisation as 
compared to agencies in developed countries such as the Nordic countries and the UK. 
However, assumption number three on contractualism can be restated to read TEVETA sets 
its own performance goals, however, approval is in the hands of the parent Ministry 
(MESVTEE). 
6.2.3 Research question 3 
How has the funding of TEVETA developed since its 
establishment? 
The results of the study indicate that the government is the main source of funding at 
TEVETA. The government through the Ministry of Finance decides at which level TEVETA 
should be funded. Wherever possible, TEVETA supplements the government funding with 
donor funding. TEVETA also gets resources from the services it offers, namely regulatory 
fees, examinations, regulation of training institutions, and accreditation of examiners, 
assessors and trainers. Furthermore, the study has shown that the current level of public 
funding is inconsistent and insufficient regarding the TEVET sector to the extent where 
planned activities sometimes are not implemented by TEVETA. Again, the results of the 
study have revealed that funding has not grown to match the current demands of the TEVET 
sector in the country which has continuously been expanding. In order to address the problem 
of insufficient funding at TEVETA, the study has revealed that TEVETA intends to get as 
many learners as possible in the sector by promoting different path ways with the intent of 
having more funds through learners’ payments. This is in line with the TEVETA strategic 
plan (2014 - 2016) which aims at promoting access to TEVET and facilitate increase in 
annual enrolments and graduate rates. Again, this is also related to the mandate in that if need 
arises to create more path ways in the TEVET sector, TEVETA holds the responsibility of 
regulating, coordinating and monitoring TEVT in the country in consultation with the 
stakeholders. 
Based on the findings and discussions of the study, it is concluded that funding of TEVETA 
has not developed in relation to the current demands of the TEVET sector in the country and 
TEVETA operates in a situation of insufficient resources.  
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6.2.4 Research question 4 
What are the main internal and external change drivers 
of TEVETA? 
The main conclusion with respect to this research question is that there is no substantial 
change that has taken place regarding the mandate of TEVETA. The findings of the study 
indicate that the mandate of helping supervising, coordinating, regulating and managing the 
TEVET sector in the country is still the same since the establishment of TEVETA. However, 
in 2005, TEVETA was given an additional function of managing the TEVET Fund for the 
purpose of sustaining training in the TEVET sector in the country. It is important to 
emphasize here that the detailed changes that have taken place at TEVETA are beyond this 
study and may require another study. This study only took into consideration finding out any 
changes concerning the mandate of TEVETA from the time of its establishment. 
6.3 Reflections on the main conclusions 
The main conclusions of the study concern (i) the rationale for setting up TEVETA, (ii) how 
it is governed and organised, (iii) how funding has developed since its establishment, and (iv) 
the main internal and external change drivers. Agencification is a reality in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, even though the underlying NPM ideology has its genesis in the developed countries. 
Public management literature has revealed that NPM and associated administrative reforms 
have spread around continents. However, compared to the situation in developed countries the 
implementation of such reforms can be argued to be different in Sub-Saharan African 
countries, even though some of the components are similar.  
The results of the study indicate that one of the main differences between agencification in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries is that the board of the agencies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are instruments of the government and are not as independent as they could be 
expected to be. For instance, the results of this study tend to be similar to the results of a study 
which was conducted at GETFund in Ghana by Kwasi-Agyemen (2015). Both studies focused 
on a single agency (TEVETA and GETFund) in the higher education sector under the 
Ministry of Education in a single particular country (Zambia and Ghana). The findings in both 
studies reveal that the parent ministries have influence in if not control of the operations of the 
agencies. The findings reveal that both agencies experience a low degree of autonomisation 
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and operate in environments with insufficient resources. In light of these findings of the study, 
the implication is therefore that the policy makers and the government should be aware of the 
functions and importance of TEVETA in higher education in the TEVET sector in the country 
hence giving it the level of autonomisation and resources it requires to achieve its goals and 
mandate. Again, the findings of this study mark the difference of the implementation of NPM 
reforms and agencification in the Sub-Saharan African countries. In this regard, it is safe to 
indicate that agencification in Sub-Sahara African countries with reference made to Ghana, 
Tanzania and Zambia displays a hybrid characteristic of the key features of the tripod model 
of agencification.  
The analytical framework used in this study can be improved by encompassing the 
contingency approach. This will add more information and provides an enhanced foundation 
for interpreting the establishment of TEVETA and institutional change that has taken place 
since its establishment. This is so in the sense that the contingency approach explains 
institutional change and timing of establishing organisations (March and Olsen, 1989). 
This study has unfolded few possibilities for further scholarly research. As indicated in 
chapter one, this study focused on the question how the development of TEVETA can be 
interpreted from the perspective of the agencification of quality assurance in the TEVET 
sector in Zambia? This study was limited in its scope hence in order to advance more 
knowledge of agencification of quality assurance in the TEVET sector in Zambia, it can be 
essential to focus on this topic with the inclusion of the TEVET institutions in the study. 
Again, future studies regarding this subject could focus on finding practical ways for 
improving agencification in Sub-Saharan African countries by taking into consideration the 
lesson of successful agencification processes in developed countries such as the Nordic 
countries and the UK, and apply it in their local social and cultural setting to address local 
needs and realities. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE MINISTRY 
 
Aim / Topic Question / Guide Timing 
Introduction Thank you for taking part in this interview. It will last between 40 
minutes and an hour. Hope you will find this interview interesting 
and interactive. Please respond honestly and openly to the questions 
of which the responses will be taken anonymous and for academic 
purposes only. 
 
 
 
Rationale 
1. What were the main reasons for establishing TEVETA? 
2. Why was TEVETA established as a separate entity from the 
Ministry? 
3. What was its original mandate? 
4. How does the Ministry of the Education ensure that TEVETA 
achieves its goals? 
 
 
10 mins 
 
Organisation 
& 
Governance 
5. How is the current relationship between the Ministry of 
Education and TEVETA? In your view, how has this 
relationship developed since the establishment of TEVETA? 
6. What role does TEVETA play in the current relationship 
between the Ministry of Education and the TEVET 
institutions? 
7. Who is the role of the Ministry of Education in the 
organisation and governance of TEVETA? 
8. Who is responsible for recruiting and appointing staff at 
TEVETA? 
9. How much influence does the Ministry of Education on 
TEVETA’s way of operation? To what extent can the 
Ministry control the decisions made by TEVETA concerning 
quality assessment? 
10. How would you describe the room to manoeuvre TEVETA 
has in developing and implementing its procedures, activities 
and practices in the area of quality assessment? 
 
 
20 mins 
 
Funding 
11. How and by whom is the level of funding determined that 
TEVETA receives receive annually? 
12. How does the Ministry fund TEVETA? 
13. In your opinion, does TEVETA receive the level of funding 
its needs to achieve its goals? 
14. How has annual level of funding TEVETA received since its 
10 mins 
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establishment developed over the years? Stable – increase - 
decrease? 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
We have come to the end of the discussion, but is there anything you 
have thought important of to be mentioned while we have been 
discussing that you wish to add. 
 
Thank you once again.  
5 mins 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR TEVETA 
 
Aim / Topic Question / Guide Timing 
Introduction Thank you for taking part in this interview. It will last between 40 
minutes and an hour. Hope you will find this interview interesting 
and interactive. Please respond honestly and openly to the questions 
of which the responses will be taken anonymous and for academic 
purposes only. 
 
 
Rationale 
1. What were the main arguments for establishing TEVETA?  
2. Why was TEVETA established as a separate entity from the 
Ministry of Education? 
3. What was its original mandate at the time of its establishment? 
Is the current mandate the same as the original one? 
4. In your opinion, has the rationale underlying TEVETA 
changed over the years? 
10 mins 
 
Organisation 
& 
Governance 
5. How is TEVETA organised? 
6. How is TEVETA governed? 
7. Who is responsible for recruiting and appointing staff at 
TEVETA? 
8. What is the role of the Ministry of Education in determining 
the organisation and governance of TEVETA? 
9. How much influence does the Ministry of Education on 
TEVETA’s way of operations? To what extent can the 
Ministry control the decisions made by TEVETA concerning 
quality assessment?  
10. To what extent is TEVETA able to make its own decisions 
concerning its programmes and activities? 
11. How does TEVETA relate to the Ministry of Education? 
12. In your opinion, does TEVETA have the capacity to develop 
and implement its own programmes and or activities?  
13. How does TEVETA relate to the colleges in the TEVET 
sector? 
 
20 mins 
 
Funding 
14. What are the main sources of funding for TEVETA? 
15. Who decides how TEVETA should fund its activities? 
16. How has been the trend of funding to TEVETA since its 
establishment (stable, increasing or decreasing)? 
17. What is TEVETA doing to increase its funding capacity? 
18. In your opinion, is the current level of funding for TEVETA 
sufficient for TEVETA to be able to achieve its goals? 
10 mins 
 
Change 
Drivers 
19.  How would you describe the main changes TEVETA has 
undergone since its establishment? 
20.  What are the main internal drivers for the change? 
21.  What are the main external drivers for the change? 
22. In your opinion do you feel that TEVETA has developed 
positively since its establishment? 
15 mins 
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Conclusion 
 
 
We have come to the end of the discussion, but is there anything you 
have thought important of to be mentioned while we have been 
discussing that you wish to add. 
Thank you once again.  
5 mins 
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